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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
WEBER MEMORIAL CARE CENTER, t 
INC. and CHARTHAM MANAGEMENT, 
INC., : 
BRIEF OP APPELLEE 
Plaintiffs and : 
Appellants, Case No. 860482 
s 
vs. 
: 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OP HEALTH, 
DIVISION OP HEALTH CARE : 
FINANCING 
Defendants and 
Respondents. : 
STATEMroT.OP^ISSUK^PRKENTEP^ON^APPE^ 
I . Whether the adminis trat ive law judge and t r i a l 
judge correc t ly ruled that Utah's Medicaid rate for long term 
care complies with federal Medicaid standards. 
I I . Whether the adminis trat ive law judge and t r i a l 
judge correc t ly excluded evidence concerning Weber Memorial's 
individual f a c i l i t y cost data. 
I I I . Whether the Utah Medicaid Agency has correct ly 
c l a s s i f i e d p a t i e n t s at Weber Memorial. 
IV. Whether the D i s t r i c t Court psed the correct 
standard of review. 
P£QCEEDINGS_IO_eATE 
P l a i n t i f f s are the owner and manager of a nursing 
f a c i l i t y in Roy, Utah. For convenience, tney w i l l be referred to 
j o i n t l y as Weber Memorial. 
P l a i n t i f f s rece ived an ev ident iary hearing before an 
adminis trat ive law judge for the Utah Department of Health. The 
h e a r i n g o f f i c e r r u l e d a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s on May 2 0 , 1985 . His 
F ind ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were adopted by the 
Execut ive D i rec to r of t h e Heal th Department on June 4 , 1985 . 
P l a i n t i f f s appealed from t h a t d e c i s i o n t o t h e D i s t r i c t 
Court for t h e Third D i s t r i c t of Utah, The case was heard by 
Judge F i s h i e r , who i s s u e d a Memorandum Opinion on June 3 r 1986 
upholding t h e hea r ing o f f i c e r ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . F ina l Judgement 
was e n t e r e d August 4 , 1986 by Judge Sco t t Danie l s fo l lowing Judge 
F i s h i e r 1 s r e t i r e m e n t from t h e bench. 
This i s an appeal from t h e r u l i n g of the D i s t r i c t 
Cour t . 
PE£TINENT_fACTS 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
T i t l e XIX of t h e Soc ia l S e c u r i t y Act f 42 USC S 1396 e t 
s e q . , commonly known as t h e Medicaid Act f e s t a b l i s h e s a 
c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which f e d e r a l and s t a t e governments 
s h a r e t h e c o s t s of medical s e r v i c e s t o c e r t a i n needy i n d i v i d u a l s 
"whose income and r e s o u r c e s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o meet the c o s t s of 
n e c e s s a r y medical s e r v i c e s . " 42 USC S 1396 (1974) . 
If a s t a t e e l e c t s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Medicaid 
Program, i t must e s t a b l i s h a " s t a t e p l an" for medical a s s i s t a n c e 
which complies with s t a t u t o r y and r e g u l a t o r y requi rements under 
t h e a c t . 42 USC S 1 3 9 6 ( b ) . See a l s o 42 USC S 1396A(a)(1) 
th rough (44) (1974) ; 42 CFR S 447 e t seq . S t a t e p l ans a r e 
developed through s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e rulemaking p rocedures and 
any changes or amendments t h e r e t o must undergo the same 
p rocedures and approval as be fo re adop t ion . Utah Code Annotated 
S 63-46 ( a ) -1 e t seq. 
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After a s t a t e draws up a medical a s s i s tance plan 
Medicaid Act and the 
submit the plan t o 
cons i s t en t with gu ide l ines contained i n the 
regulat ions promulgated thereunder, i t must 
the Health Care Financing Administration (H£FA), an agency of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHp , for approval. If 
HCFA approves the plan, the s t a t e becomes e l i g i b l e for federal 
matching funds for reimbursement of the cost of medical 
a s s i s t a n c e . 42 USC S 1396B(a). 
In 1980, Congress enacted supplemental Medicaid 
l e g i s l a t i o n ; part of an "Omnibus Reconc i l ia t ion Act." Prior to 
1980, MedicaidVfclans were required by federal law to reimburse 
nursing homes for the ir "reasonable c o s t s . " Sect ion 962 of the 
Omnibus Reconc i l ia t ion Act de le ted the previous requirement that 
s t a t e agencies pay for long term care f a c i l i t y s e r v i c e s on a 
"reasonable cost" b a s i s . Instead, the new l e g i s l a t i o n al lows 
s t a t e s to pay providers through the use of predetermined rates 
that "are reasonable and adequate to meet tne c o s t s which must be 
incurred by e f f i c i e n t l y and economically operated providers 
. . . ." Compare 42 USC S 1396A13E (enacted in 1976) (copy at 
Tab "A"), with 42 USC S 1396A(a)(13)(A) (replacing the e a r l i e r 
s e c t i o n in 1980) (copy at Tab "B"). 
facts^fgpp„rhe jtecord 
In 1981, fo l lowing the change in federal law mentioned 
above, the Utah nursing home industry , through the Utah Health 
Care Assoc ia t ion , urged the Utah Legis la ture t o adopt a "modified 
f l a t rate" methodology of reimbursement. Tpe l e g i s l a t u r e 
responded by adopting an in tent document d irec t ing the Department 
3-
of Health to e s t a b l i s h a f l a t - r a t e committee to develop a method 
of payment for nursing homes that would f o s t e r cost containment 
and assure r e c i p i e n t s of high qua l i ty care* After considering 
var ious a l t e r n a t i v e , the rate committee developed a modified 
f l a t - r a t e method of nursing home reimbursement based on the most 
recent ava i lab le cost data. Transcript , Testimony of Roy Dunn at 
pp. 43 and 4 4 . The modified f l a t - r a t e methodology was submitted 
through the rulemaking process for publ ic comment, and a publ ic 
hearing was he ld . T r . , Sharon Wasek at pp. 312-313. There were 
no d i s sen t ing v o t e s from the nursing home industry . Id . 
Pursuant t o f ^ e r a l law, the defendant State Department of Health 
made f indings and assurances t o the Secretary of HHS that the 
f l a t rate methodology was "reasonable and adequate to meet the 
c o s t s which must be incurred by e f f i c i e n t l y and economically 
operated prov iders ." That f l a t rate methodology was approved and 
c e r t i f i e d by HHS as meeting a l l requirements of federal law and 
regu la t ion . The f l a t rate methodology was then adopted by s t a t e 
rulemaking i n t o law e f f e c t i v e July 1 , 1981. Id . 
Two months af ter the e f f e c t i v e date of the f l a t r a t e , 
in September of 1981, Mr. Don Bybee (who owns both p l a i n t i f f 
corporations) acquired an e x i s t i n g hosp i ta l f a c i l i t y from Weber 
County. Tr . , Don Bybee at p . 572. Mr. Bybee was an experienced 
and s o p h i s t i c a t e d businessman in the heal th care industry. He 
had previously been employed as the execut ive v i c e president of 
Truscan Corporation which had acquired 26 nursing homes and had 
increased i t s revenue by approximately $28,500,000 during the 
time of Mr. Bybee1s employment between Ju ly , 1976 and December, 
1980. Tr . , Don Bybee, pp. 565-566. 
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After Mr. Bybee purchased the Web^r County facility in 
his individual capacity he immediately leased the facility to the 
newly organized Oregon Corporation, Weber Memorial Care Center, 
Inc., of which he is president, director and 100% stock owner. 
Tr.f Don Bybee, pp. 587, 588 and 603. Mr. Bybee then employed 
Chartham Management, Inc., a Washington corporation of which he 
is president, director and 100% stock holder, to manage the 
facility. Tr., Don Bybee at p. 603. 
At the time Mr. Bybee purchased t^ ie Weber County 
Hospital facility, he knew of its costs and was cognizant of the 
fact that Web6V County was losing $90,000 per month on that 
facility. Tr., Don Bybee, p. 576. Mr. Bybee was aware that he 
was purchasing a hospital facility and that certain portions of 
it were not normally associated with nursing homes; including a 
large auditorium, surgical area, laboratoryL and x-ray 
facilities. Tr., Roy Dunn, pp. 96 and 97; Tr., Don Bybee, p. 
632. Despite these facts Mr. Bybee testified that he intended to 
pursue his previous pattern (as executive vice president of 
Truscan Corporation) of turning certain unprofitable nursing 
homes into profitable ventures. Tr., Don Bybee, pp. 566-567. 
When Mr. Bybee acquired the Weber County facility on 
September 1, 1981, he was aware that the state's modified flat 
rate methodology had been in effect since July 1, 1981 and 
considered the flat rate in negotiating the purchase price. Tr., 
Don Bybee, p. 585. Purther, at the time Mr. Bybee was 
negotiating to purchase, and actually did purchase the Weber 
County facility, he was operating other nursing homes in Utah 
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which were already being paid under the statewide modified flat 
rate. Tr., Don Bybee, p. 585. 
There are approximately one hundred Utah nursing homes 
which accept Medicaid patients. The modified flat rate is 
presently reimbursing somewhere between 79%. and 93% of Utahfs 
nursing homes at a level which meets or exceeds their actual 
costs. Tr., Roy Dunn, pp. 91, 92, 679 and 680. Weber Memorial 
is one of the small group of nursing homes whose actual costs for 
patient care are not being fully met by the modified flat rate. 
At least one reason for this is apparent — and it has nothing to 
do with the "inadequacy" of the rate. 
When Weber County owned the facility, it was licensed 
as a "chronic disease hospital." The scope of this licensure 
permitted the operation of a laboratory, x-ray machine, and 
pharmacy on the premises. Mr. Bybee relied on this revenue in 
making his purchase. Within a year after his purchase, however, 
the state abolished the license category of "chronic disease 
hospital." Thus, Weber Memorial could only operate its facility 
as a nursing home. This change in licensure resulted in a 
revenue loss of $10,000 a month. It is perhaps no coincidence 
that this is the same amount of loss per month that Don Bybee and 
his administrator have testified that the facility loses every 
month* See Tr., Don Bybee, pp. 619 and 623; David Elliot Tr. at 
p. 772. In fact the owner, Mr. Bybee, blamed the phase-out of 
chronic disease hospitals on his present woes: 
•To continue on with what I was saying, we're 
losing $10,500 a month because the state 
phased out of the chronic disease hospital 
portion, which we lost prescription revenue 
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because we1re not e n t i t l e d t o $3.SO per 
pat ient per day per prescr ipt ion as 
prescr ip t ions were dispensed. We l o s t 
laboratory/x-ray revenue. The prescr ip t ion 
revenue, laboratory, x-ray revenue amounted 
to $10,500 a month. The s t a t e changed the 
regulat ion on us. There was nothing we could 
do on that . And that was the primary l o s s . 
If that had not changed we would be able to 
come c l o s e to the c o s t s at presenf. But the 
s t a t e changes those r e g u l a t i o n s . " 
Tr . , Don Bybee at p . 632. Thus, Weber Memorial1s f a i l u r e to have 
i t s c o s t s met by the modified f l a t rate i s a d irec t r e s u l t of Mr. 
Bybee's purchase of a chronic d i sease hosp i ta l instead of a 
nursing f a c i l i t y . Utah's modified f l a t r a t i i s per fec t ly 
adequate to reimburse nursing care. I t may not be adequate to 
reimburse Mr. Bybee1s mortgage c o s t s on a hosp i ta l f a c i l i t y . 
Because Weber Memorial l o s t the opportunity t o appeal the s t a t e ' s 
dec i s ion t o phase out chronic d i sease hosp i ta l l i c e n s u r e s by not 
f i l i n g in a timely manner, (see Utah Code Annotated § 26-21-10) , 
i t now has sought to recoup l o s t revenue by suing Utah's Medicaid 
nursing care program. 
&BSOMENT 
K>INT_I 
UTAH'S MEDICAID RATE FOR LONG TER !^ CARE 
COMPORTS WITH FEDERAL MEDICAID STANDARDS. 
A. Federal standards al low s t a t e s the f l e x i b i l i t y of 
def in ing e f f i c i e n c y and economy i n terms of a s tatewide r a t e . 
Prior to 1980, p a r t i c i p a t i n g s t a t e s were required t o 
reimburse providers on the b a s i s of "reasonable c o s t s . " This 
meant that nursing f a c i l i t i e s could incur c o s t s which the 
Medicaid Agency was ob l iga ted to repay in f ikl l . Under the pre-
1980 system of reimbursement, Medicaid paid whatever rate the 
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facility charged its private paying patients. The result was a 
system in which the State paid as many different rates for a day 
of skilled and a day of intermediate care as there were 
facilities. Moreover, because each facility could simply recoup 
from the state whatever costs it incurred, there was no incentive 
whatsoever to contain costs. Hence, the costs of long term care 
in the Medicaid program were increasing at an alarming rate — 
18% to 20% each year. Tr., J. Winslow, p. 383. Some of this 
increase resulted from "trafficking" in nursing homes. Each 
successive buyer of a nursing home would purchase a facility, 
receive payment from the state inflated to the actual cost of his 
purchase, hold it for a short time, and then sell it at an 
enormous profit to the next buyer, who in turn would receive from 
the state inflated rates based on the actual cost of his 
purchase. Tr., of Jay Winslow at pp. 414 and 415; Roy Dunn at p. 
663. Similar experiences nationwide led Congress to enact the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-499) , which 
amended the Social Security Act to permit states to stop paying 
actual costs of long term facilities and, instead, to establish 
statewide rates which are "reasonable and adequate to meet the 
costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
operated providers to provide services in conformity with 
applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and quality and 
safety standards." 42 USC S 1396A (a)(13)(A) and 42 CFR S 
447.252. 
The purpose of the amendment was to permit states the 
flexibility to stop reimbursing the actual costs of individual 
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f a c i l i t i e s and to enable them to move toward perspect ive payments 
systems which encourage e f f i c i e n c y and economy. The Senate 
Report accompanying the new language s t a t e s : 
The committee continues to b e l i e v e that 
s t a t e s should have f l e x i b i l i t y in developing 
methods of payment for the Medicaid programs 
and that app l i ca t ion of the reasonable cost 
reimbursement p r i n c i p l e s of the Medicare 
Program for long term care f a c i l i t i e s 
s e r v i c e s i s not e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . These 
p r i n c i p l e s are inherently in f la t ionary and 
contain_no_incentives_f or_ef f ici.ent 
P§EfPI5)£Dce. The committee b i l l a e l e t e s the 
present language • . . and s u b s t i t u t e s 
language which g ives the s t a t e s f l e x i b i l i t y 
and d i s c r e t i o n , subject to the s tatutory 
reguj^ements^pf t h i s „ s e c t i o n ^ to formulate 
theTt own methods and standards of payment. 
Under the b i l l , s t a t e s would be free to 
e s t a b l i s h rates on a statewide orTother 
geographic bas i s # a c l a s s bas is ,~pr an 
i n s t i t u t i o n by i n s t i t u t i o n basis ,Twithout 
reference to Medicare p r i n c i p l e s of 
reimbursement. 
Senate Report No. 96-471 , 96th Congress, Second Sess ion , 
Reprinted in 4 CCH Medicare and Medicaid Gu^de, paragraph 24,407 
a t 8780 - 81 (1981) and copied at Tab "C". 
longer required to pay the rates demanded by individual 
f a c i l i t i e s . It goes without saying that under a f ixed rate 
methodology, some f a c i l i t i e s w i l l very l i k e l y recover t h e i r f u l l 
c o s t s plus a p r o f i t , and others w i l l not r ece ive t h e i r f u l l 
c o s t s . The State pays every f a c i l i t y the s^ une r a t e , and i t i s 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of nursing home owners aijid administrators t o 
reduce c o s t s in order to make a p r o f i t . 
Following the 1980 amendments t o the Socia l Security 
Act, Utah moved a t the behest of fcfre„jiursinti frpme,jpdustry i t s e l f 
t o adopt a statewide rate for long term care . T r . , Charles 
Thus, s t a t e s are no 
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Doane, p. 181; Tr., Roy Dunn at pp. 61, 62; Tr. , Dennis McFall p. 
159; Tr.f Jay Winslow pp. 382-86. The Utah Legislature provided 
for the formation of a "flat rate committee" to be composed of 
nursing home representatives, legislators, a legislative fiscal 
analyst, and Department of Health officials. Tr., Charles Doane, 
p. 181. After considering a number of alternatives, and using as 
its data base the most recent information on the actual costs 
incurred by the nursing home industry, the committee adopted a 
•modified flat rate." Tr., Roy Dunn, pp. 43, 44, and 79, and p. 
104. 
The committee e s t a b l i s h e d a s i n g l e weighted average 
rate for each c l a s s of p a t i e n t : s k i l l e d care , intermediate care 
and mentally retarded care . T r . , Roy Dunn, pp. 722-23 . This 
f l a t rate was the same s tatewide . The committee then decided to 
i n f l a t e t h i s "base rate" annually on the b a s i s of the consumer 
pr i ce index for urban areas minus mortgage i n t e r e s t cos t s (the 
CPI-U l e s s mortgage). Next the committee developed a "property 
d i f f e r e n t i a l " derived from the h i s t o r i c c o s t s of each indiv idual 
f a c i l i t y plus a return on equity ( i . e . , p r o f i t ) . This 
d i f f e r e n t i a l was, therefore unique to each f a c i l i t y and was paid 
in addi t ion to the f l a t base r a t e . Two-fifths of t h i s property 
d i f f e r e n t i a l (or $2.00 per day of care) was added to and i n f l a t e d 
along with the base rate each year to cover increases in the 
c o s t s of property tax , insurance, maintenance and cont ingenc ies . 
The remaining t h r e e - f i f t h s of the property d i f f e r e n t i a l was not 
i n f l a t e d and remained s t a t i c . Tr . , Roy Dunn, pp. 47-49 , 655, 
663 . The methodology was submitted for public hearing in which 
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rate, the facility 
there was not one,dissentj.ngHopinipn^frpmthe^nursing home 
industry. After federal review and approval, the methodology was 
adopted by rulemaking effective July 1, 1981. Tr.f Sharon Wasek, 
p. 312-313, 
The methodology produced a number of benefits for both 
the nursing home industry and for the state* First, and most 
important, the methodology itself established the definition of 
what was an "efficiently and economically operated facility." 
Tr., Roy Dunn, p. 692. If the provider cou^d reduce its costs 
below the established flat rate, it kept thf difference as 
profit, if edits went over the established 
suffered a loss. Hence, the provider had eyery incentive to 
operate as efficiently and economically as possible. Tr., Roy 
Dunn, Tr., pp. 723-24. 
The second benefit to the industry was that providers 
now had the opportunity to legitimately earij* profit. Under the 
old system, the state legally could consider only "actual 
reasonable costs" which did not, by definition, include any 
profit. Tr., Roy Dunn, p. 61. 
This led to a third benefit — th^ opportunity for 
nursing home providers to operate with increased autonomy. They 
were now free to incur any expense they thought appropriate or 
necessary to the operation of their busines^, and the state did 
not retroactively review their costs, determine which of them it 
considered "reasonable" and then recoup the amount of costs 
disallowed as "unreasonable" or reduce the rate accordingly. Id. 
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A fourth important benefit to the industry and the 
state was that both were relieved of the onerous burden of the 
annual audit of nursing home costs to insure that the state had 
paid rates based only on "reasonable11 actual costs. This 
administrative burden of conducting an audit annually on each 
nursing home and the equal burden of being audited annually 
produced an ongoing multitude of disputes, informal and formal 
hearings and appeals between the state and the nursing homes. 
All of this was eliminated under the flat rate: the state paid a 
fixed amount for a day of care; the nursing home operator could 
spend it as his or her best judgment dictated, and the state did 
not attempt to oversee those expenditures or recoup any money. 
Tr., Roy Dunn, pp. 713-14. 
Fifth, the flat rate methodology brought a complete 
halt to spiralling costs in the Medicaid Program which resulted 
from the buying and selling of nursing homes. The flat rates 
remained the same regardless of a transfer of ownership, so that 
although anyone was free to buy or sell, to enter or leave the 
marketplace, his purchase bid of necessity had to take into 
account the payment rate the seller received. As a result, the 
marketplace stabilized and the state saved money. Tr., Roy Dunn, 
p. 718. 
Clearly, the establishment of a modified flat rate has 
benefited both the state and the nursing industry. 
B. Federal standards do not require states to 
reimburse the actual costs incurred by each nursing home. 
In accordance with federal regulations, the defendant 
made findings and assurances to the Federal Government that the 
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rates established under the flat rate methodology were 
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred 
by efficiently and economically operated providers." Estimates 
at the time the flat rate was adopted and actual experience 
since, prove that 79%. to 93% of nursing homes in the Medicaid 
Program have their costs met or are making a profit under the 
rates* Tr., Roy Dunn, pp. 679-680* Put another way, this means 
that only somewhere between 7%,and 21% of the nursing homes in 
Utah do not have their costs fully met by the flat rate. The 
fact that a small number of nursing homes do not receive their 
that the flat rate 
Supreme Court of 
actual costs ffom Medicaid is no indication 
methodology was improperly enacted. As the 
Nebraska recognized in Haven Homef Inc. y. bepartment, of Public 
Welfare, 346 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Nebraska 1984): 
The Medicaid Program is not designed to 
protect health care providers from the 
consequences of their business decisions or 
business risks. 
Weber Memorial worries that Utah's rate is Arbitrary, inasmuch as 
some providers may be working to reduce costs, yet still 
experience costs above the rates. Weber Memorial asserts that: 
Some of the most profitable nursing homes may 
well be the least economic^and.least 
efficient providers of gualitv care. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 14, (emphasis in original). Hence, the 
implication is that the State may not define efficiency in terms 
of a bottom-line rate for nursing care. This contention was 
addressed in Marry Washington Hospital, |nc. vy Fisher# 635 
F.Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985). Mary Washington Hospital protested 
Virginia's Medicaid rate for hospitals on the basis that the 
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State had produced no evidence that "hospitals Iwith costs] above 
the median are uneconomical and inefficient" Id. at 899. The 
court responded: 
[The Boren Amendment] clearly is intended to 
allow states to engage in price-conscious 
•shopping" for hospital services for Medicaid 
recipients. If two hospitals in a given 
locality, for instance, offer the same 
quality services at widely disparate rates, 
the average consumer need not do an 
efficiency study before determining not to 
pay the higher-priced hospital1s rate. [The 
State] may now set the rates it is willing to 
pay in much the same fashion. 
Id. 
The Medicaid Agency realizes that both variable and 
fixed costs will differ — sometimes substantially — from 
facility to facility. Each facility providing Medicaid Services 
is examined on a regular basis to ensure that the services to 
patients meet the level of care standards. Rather than haggle 
with each facility over the necessity or wisdom of incurring 
particular costs, Utah has chosen to affix a bottom line rate 
(with allowance for fixed capital costs incurred by providers 
prior to institution of the rates) so that facility managers will 
have all decisionmaking authority concerning operations. 
Weber Memorial spends considerable time making the 
point that Utah has not defined the terms "economy" and 
•efficiency", and that the Flat Rate Committee did not make 
written findings that the rate was adequate to reimburse 
efficiently and economically operated providers. Terms like 
efficiency and economy are not susceptible to precise linguistic 
definitions. Thus, the Federal Government has permitted states 
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to define efficiency and economy in terms o£ the rate itself, in 
its official comments to the final rule published in the Federal 
Register December 19, 1983, page 56049, the Federal Department of 
Health and Human Services stated: 
We have also decided not to mandate that the 
states1 plans specifically provide a 
definition of "efficiently and economically 
operated facility." The reason f0r this is 
that the states' methods and standards 
implicitly act as the states1 definition of 
an efficiently and economically operated 
facility and^no explicit definition is 
necessary. 
In Mary Washington Hospital, Jnc. v. Fisher, supra, 635 
F.Supp. at 89£;r the Court specifically "rejects plaintiff's 
contention that Virginia must have made written findings. The 
federal regulations do not specify that the findings must be in 
writing." (emphasis in original). The fact that the flat rate 
committee defined economy and efficiency through its recommended 
rate does not render the rate out of compliance with federal law. 
In essence, apart from a rate which is arbitrary and 
capricious, the determination of a fixed rate which reimburses 
the "economical" and "efficient" provider i|s left to the 
discretion of the participating states and the federal agency 
with oversight of Medicaid. Under the Boren Amendment, it is for 
states, subject to approval by the federal contracting agency, to 
supply meaning and content to the words "economy" and 
•efficiency." 
Utah's modified flat rate was established by a broadly 
representative non-partisan body. The rate represents the flat 
rate committee's judgment as to the cut-off point for an 
efficiently and economically operated facility. 
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Weber Memorial's argument is similar to that made by 
the plaintiffs who lost their motion for a preliminary injunction 
in Coalition of Michigan Nursing Homes,m Inc. y. Dempsey* 537 Fed. 
Supp. 451 (D.C. Mich. 1982). Pempsey was filed to stop 
Michigan's Medicaid Agency from setting a cap on reimbursement of 
variable costs in long term care facilities. The Michigan 
Legislature, acting under the pressure of impending deficits and 
a "balanced budget" provision in the State Constitution, cut its 
Medicaid budget by over $3,000,000. In response, the state's 
Medicaid Agency capped long term care reimbursement at the 
eightieth percentile of variable costs for all providers. The 
court observed that this rate capping implicitly "represents the 
state's determination that homes whose allowable costs are in the 
top twenty percent of its class are not 'economically and 
efficiently operated.1 • Id. 
In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that federal 
regulations require a review of all facilities on an individual 
basis to determine the impact of the 80% "cap", the court 
summarized its findings as follows: 
Plaintiff's interpretation finds no support 
in statutes, regulations, legislative history 
or any of the testimony before the court. On 
the contrary, the essence of the Boren 
Amendment was to reduce this very type of 
detailed oversight. 
Jd« at 463. See also ^ississippi^ppspital^Associationx. Inc., _y^_ 
Heckler, 701 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Utah's long term care rate, like Michigan's, acts as an 
implicit Medicaid definition of economy and efficiency. 
16-
C. Utah"8 rate was set in accordance with federal 
standards and is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
One of the key words used by the £enate Finance 
Committee in its report on the 1980 amendments was 'flexibility. 
The report stated: 
The Committee continues to believ£ that 
states should have flexibility inj developing 
methods of payment for their Medicaid 
programs and that applications of the 
reasonable costs reimbursements principles of 
the Medicare program for long term care 
facility services is not entirely 
satisfactory. The Committee bill deletes the 
present language . . . and substitutes 
language which gives the states flexibility 
and discretion." 
S.R. No. 96-471, Tab •C". 
Quoted in Federal Register, Volum^ 46, No. 189, 
Wednesday, September 30, 1981. Later, the federal administering 
agency stated as follows: 
The major purpose of the regulatibn was to 
implement amendments to the Medicaid law that 
are designed to increase states1 flexibility 
in setting payment rates for thosp purposes 
while keeping federal reporting and other 
administrative requirements to the minimum 
necessary to assure proper accounting. 
Federal Register, Volume 48, No. 244, Monday, December 19, 1983. 
The record shows that Utah exercised its discretion to 
set a payment rate in a logical and reasonable manner. There is 
nothing to indicate that the rate was set ai 
capriciously. 
rbitrarily or 
Weber Memorial is a member of the 
Association. In fact, Weber Memorial now has a member of its 
administration on the Flat Rate Committee -
develops and recommends nursing care rates ^o the Health 
Utah Health Care 
the group that 
-17-
Department. In 1981 the nursing home industry, through the Utah 
Health Care Association, approached the Utah Legislature during 
its general session and uiged it to adopt a modified flat rate 
methodology of reimbursement. In a letter to members of the 
Joint Social Services Appropriations Committee, the nursing 
association said: 
Utah Health Care Association strongly 
supports and recommends adopting a system 
which will, in fact, return such operating 
control to the owner or administrator and we 
have taken steps toward the development of 
such as system, one which will relate to the 
cost of efficient operations and meet the 
requirements of state and federal regulations 
pertaining to the Medicaid program. Such a 
program gives recognition to the free 
enterprise system. It is a pro-competitive 
approach to reimbursement. Such a system can 
be defined as a modified flat rate system, 
the concept of which has been discussed with 
and approved by Dr. James Mason and other 
officials of the Department of Health. 
Defendants Exhibit 1, Trial Record. 
The legislature responded by adopting a legislative 
intent document, directing the Department of Health to establish 
a committee to develop a "more cost-effective and economical 
system such as a modified flat rate system, . . . to assure 
Medicaid recipients of high quality care." Defendant's Exhibit 
2, Trial Record. In accordance with the legislature's mandate, a 
committee was established consisting of nursing home 
representatives, legislators, legislative fiscal analysts, the 
Director of the State Department of Health and a Medicaid 
reimbursement specialist. Defendant's Exhibit 2, Trial Record. 
In ongoing meetings, the flat rate committee considered 
various methodologies. Defendant's Exhibit 13, Trial Record. It 
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considered and rejected "Alternative B," which was simply to 
inflate the rates paid to nursing homes in April, 1981. It also 
considered "Alternative C," which was to establish the nursing 
home rates on the basis of available budget, but this was 
rejected outright because of the committee1s awareness that such 
a methodology might not coincide with the reasonable needs of the 
Medicaid System. Finally, the committee (including the three 
nursing home representatives) developed and unanimously adopted 
•Alternative A," a modified flat rate method of statewide 
payment, based on an analysis of reasonable and adequate 
experienced CQSts throughout Utah." Tr., Roy Dunn, pp. 43-44, 
64, 79,104. Dennis McFall - the individual quoted in a Weber 
Memorial's brief - was on that Coramitee and voted in favor of the 
modified flat rate, along with the other nursing home owners, 
Dennis W. Nichols and Richard Brown. 
The flat rate methodology was approved and certified by 
the Department of Health and Human Services) 
requirements of federal law and regulation, 
law effective July 1, 1981 as an amendment ^o the Utah State Plan 
for Payment to nursing home providers for Medicaid services 
rendered. 
Thus, the entire procedure which the state followed was 
designed to ensure that the modified flat rate was both 
reasonable and adequate to meet the reasonable costs which must 
be incurred by economically and efficiently operated facilities 
in order to provide care and services in conformity with 
applicable state and federal laws. 42 USC S 1396A(a)(13)(A)• In 
as meeting all 
and was adopted into 
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essence, Weber Memorial is now asking this Appellate Court to 
revamp Utah's rate without the benefit of professional expertise 
or citizen input on the subject. 
D. Utah's rate was not constructed •solely* or 
•principally" to fit the state budget • 
Weber Memorial1s argument appears to be predicated on 
the assumption that budgetary considerations should not enter 
into the determination of a state Medicaid plan. Nothing could 
be further from the truth, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
pointed out in tfississippi^BogPital„AssociatipnMyy Heckler, 701 
F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1983) : 
[The state's obligation to comply with 
federal regulations] should not be read to 
mean that states cannot consider cost 
efficiency in adopting reimbursement plans, 
or that the courts should engage in some type 
of "motivation analysis." 
At this point in time, no one can reasonably hope to 
reconstruct the weight given to budgetary concerns by the seven 
members of the flat rate committee, nor is any such mental 
reconstruction called for by law or regulation. It is not our 
task to psychoanalyze the members of the flat rate committee in 
determining whether Utah's plan comports with federal 
regulations. It is the product of that committee which is of 
concern. If the state plan does not comport with federal 
regulations then the flat rate committee's motivation in 
formulating the plan adds nothing to the plaintiff's case. On 
the other hand, if, as the state maintains, the plan was in 
complete accord with federal regulations and guidelines, the flat 
rate committee's motivation in promulgating it is irrelevant. 
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The only case of which we are aware in which budgetary 
considerations were allowed to defeat a sta 
instance where, pfter designing a plan which was reasonable and 
adequate to meet the necessary costs of the 
discovered that the appropriation was insufficient. The rate 
e plan was in an 
program, it was 
was then arbitrarily 
within the 
schedule, which had already been developed, 
reduced so that projected payments would fi 
appropriation. It was held that the new rate was set under 
arbitrary conditions and did not comply with federal law. 
Country Home, Inc. v. Harder. 228 Kan. 756, 620 P.2d 1140 (1980). 
But it is by no means clear that a state plan is 
invalid, even when state appropriations are the sole 
consideration in adoption of the plan. In Charleston.Memorial v. 
Conrad, 693 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1982), it wai admitted by all 
sides that the regulations limiting allowable patient days per 
year was enacted solely to fit a smaller appropriation than had 
been expected. However, the Fourth Circuit 
concerns were a very real part of developing a statewide plan, 
and held the regulations valid, since 88% of the Medicaid 
inpatient population would still be served by the plan. Id. And 
in Colorado Health gare,Association vy Colorado pept. of Social 
££IYices# 598 F.Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1984) , appeai_pendiag, No. 
85-1016 (10th Cir.), the court wrote that "Clearly, budgetary 
ruled that budgetary 
considerations can enter into a State's evaluation and 
development of a funding plan.* See also ft^ry Washington Hosp^ 
Inc.t supra., 635 F.Supp. at 900-01. 
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Utah1s flat rate was not developed solely, or even 
primarily, to fit a budget* The modified flat rate was developed 
in a systematic manner and was never reduced thereafter to fit a 
budget, nor does the evidence developed at the hearing show 
anything more than a passing reference to budgetary concerns by 
the flat rate committee. Weber Memorial roust hang its hat on Dr. 
Mason's remark that the flat rate committee should "remember that 
state resources are not infinite.* This truism is not an 
evidentiary basis for finding that the Committee based the rate 
on State appropriations to an "inappropriate" extent, much less 
that budgetary concerns were the sole consideration. 
Upon the conclusion of the formal administrative 
hearing, the independent administrative law judge made the 
following findings: 
The flat rate derived for each class of 
patients was based on the most recent 
information on the actual costs being 
incurred by the nursing home industry in the 
aggregate, as recorded by each facility on 
its 1980 "Facility Cost Profile" (FCP); on 
comparison with the rates that other states 
were paying for nursing home services in 
Federal Region VIII; on input from the Utah 
Health Care Association; on a trending factor 
of the historical costs as recommended by 
Luhan k Associates, a consulting firm that 
was retained by the State; on comparison with 
1976 rates as inflated forward; on the 
legislative budget allocation; and on 
discussions and interactions on the 
committee. . . .No. 33. 
Plaintiffs have failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
•modified flat rate committee," or the 
Department of Health acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously in the development and 
promulgation of the modified flat rate 
methodology of payment. 
-22-
Proposed Decision, findings of fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered May 20, 1985 adopted by the Executive Director June 4, 
1985. In his Minute Book entry of June 2, 1986, Judge Fishier 
made the following findings: 
The Court, having heard argument of counsel, 
reviewed the record and memoranda on file 
herein, and being fully advised i^i the 
premises, finds that the conduct bf the State 
of Utah in establishing its modified flat 
rate plan of reimbursement for health care 
providers was reasonable and adequate. The 
Court finds that the State of Utaft did not 
base its decision solely on budgetary 
constraints. Lastly, the Court determines 
that the decision of the administrative law 
judge, was supported by sufficientf evidence. 
Weber Memorial argues that Utah1s rate was based "to an 
impermissible extent" upon budget factors. The phrase itself 
implies that there is some permissible extent to which the rate 
may be influenced by budgetary concerns, Wfeber Memorial never 
attempts to explain where the line should bp drawn between 
permissible and impermissible amounts of influence by budgetary 
concerns. On this point, Weber Memorial's legal argument is 
for the "budget 
No. 96-1167, 
floating in the air. The textual grounding 
concerns" argument is found in House Report 
reprinted at 1980 U.S.C and Congressional apd Administrative 
News, Volume V, page 5944. That report merely discountenances 
sole reliance upon budgetary concerns: 
The conferees would further note their intent 
that a state not develop rates under this 
section folely on the basis of budgetary 
appropriations, (emphasis added) 
Thus, the conferees of the House and Senate used the term 
•solely" in clear recognition of the fact that budgetary concerns 
would inevitably play a part in establishing state rates. 
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Neither of the cases cited by Weber Memorial stands for 
the proposition that there is some vague line to be drawn between 
permissible and impermissible budgetary considerations. 
Califpyni^^9spital^Assoclat iop_y J [ ,Schweikej:f 559 F.Supp. 110 (C. 
D. Cal. 1982) and Ihom&s^y^iohnston, 557 F.Supp. 879 (W. D. Tex. 
1983) are both predicated ( inter a l i a ) on the fac t that the rates 
were determined s o l e l y on the bas i s of budgetary appropriat ions . 
As the court said in Jhomas, supra at 914: 
The court has come t o the re luctant 
conclus ions that the appropriations cap i s 
the only element in the record that begins to 
explain why TDHR s e t ra tes at the f o r t i e t h 
p e r c e n t i l e l e v e l . (emphasis added). 
The Thomas court c i t e d with approval the standards s e t out in 
Coal i t ion of Michigan Nursing Homes yy Dempsey, 537 F.Supp. at 
463: 
One court recently stated that Congress's 
primary concern in declaring that 
reimbursement rates should not be determined 
•solely on the basis of budgetary 
appropriation" was that the most recent 
change in the federal statutory standard "not 
be read as repealing the rate setting process 
and returning to pre-1972 reimbursement 
schemes which determined daily rates simply 
by dividing the annual budget allotment by 
the number of patient days." (emphasis 
added). 
The Thomas court also observed that the state has very legitimate 
interests in tending to its budget: 
In the court's view, defendants argument 
that budgetary realities may properly be 
taken into account in the rate setting 
process is correct, 
Ijj. There is no evidence in this record that the flat rate 
committee placed predominant, conclusive, or sole reliance upon 
budgetary factors in the development of the flat rate. 
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E?I!?T_U 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE AND DISTRICT OODRT 
CORRECTLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE CONCERNING WEBER 
MEMORIAL'S FACILITY COSTS. 
A. Rate Bakers were nor required by federal standards 
the fair hearing, 
evidence as to its 
to adjust the rate for every conceivable facility cost* 
We have discussed the difference between the pre-1980 
method of "cost" reimbursement and the post|l980 methodology 
utilizing standard rates. In the course of 
Weber Memorial sought to introduce detailed 
facility costs, for the purpose of proving that the facility was 
being operated in an economical and efficient manner. The agency 
responded with a motion to exclude such evidence as irrelevant to 
the inquiry at hand. The hearing officer excluded the evidence, 
and was upheld on this point by the District Court on appeal. 
There are three reason why evidence of Weber Memorial's 
costs was irrelevant. First, the State is not longer required to 
pay reasonable costs, as it was before the JBoren Amendment. 
Second, the definition of "economy11 and "efriciency" has been 
left to the discretion of the states, subject to approval by the 
federal administering agency. Utah has defined those terms by 
means of a statewide rate, which has received the approval of 
H.H.S. It is widely recognized that Congre ss may delegate 
discretionary powers to a federal agency and that decisions made 
by the agency pursuant to those discretionary powers are only 
reviewable on very narrow grounds. In one Medicaid case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court declared: 
In view of this explicit delegation of 
substantive authority, the Secret 
definition of the term "available 
ary1 s 
" is 
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•entitled to more than mere deference or 
weight." . . • Rather, the Secretary's 
definition is entitled to "legislative 
effect" because, "liln a situation of this 
kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, 
rather than to the courts, the primary 
responsibility for interpreting the statutory 
term." . . . Although we do not abdicate 
review in these circumstances, our task is 
the limited one of ensuring that the 
Secretary did not "exceeld] his statutory 
term authority" and that the regulation is 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers. 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). 
Evidence of Weber Memorial's costs would not have the 
slightest impact upon the judge's determination of whether the 
Utah rate is atbitrary or capricious. 
Finally, Weber Memorial's costs are not relevant to the 
question of patient care. In a rate hearing, Weber Memorial must 
show that the rate adversely benefits patients. A mere showing 
that a particular health care provider cannot make money under 
the State's rate is meaningless. 
In
 In re Estate of Smith v. 0'Halloran, 557 F.Supp. 2 89 
(D. Colo. 1983), the district court made a finding that the 
Secretary's actions were "facility oriented," rather than 
•patient oriented." Id., 557 F.Supp. at 295. Hearing the case 
on appeal the Tenth Circuit wrote: 
Nothing the Medicaid Act indicates that 
Congress intended the physical facilities to 
be the end product. Rather, the purpose of 
the Act is to provide medical assistance and 
rehabilitative services [to patients]. 
Effete.. of Smith y. Schweiker. 747 F.2d 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1984). 
Weber Memorial's proffer was clearly "provider oriented," and not 
•patient oriented." 
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The fair hearing officer's power to exclude irrelevant 
evidence is supported by the state statute establishing the 
hearing process: 
In any such hearing, the hearing bfficer 
shall have authority to administer oaths, 
examine witnesses, and issue in the name of 
the department notice of the hearings or 
subpoenas requiring the testimony of 
witnesses and the production^of evidence 
relevant to any matter^in the heading. 
(emphasis added!• 
Utah Code Annotated § 26-23-2 (1953 as amended 1981) . (Emphasis 
added.) Under the explicit authority of th£ foregoing provision, 
the Health Department has adopted a set of procedures entitled 
•Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid Recipients and 
Providers." That document governs the Departments informal and 
formal hearings. Those procedures substantially follow the 
general rules of evidence, and require the fair hearing officer 
to exclude irrelevant evidence. The section covering evidence in 
formal hearings reads as follows in pertinent part: 
The ru le s of evidence, as applied 
a c t i o n s in the courts of t h i s s t a t e , s h a l l be 
general ly fol lowed in the hearing^. 
I rre l evant , immaterial_and unduly 
eyidence_ghall be excluded. (emppasis 
added). 
in civil 
 l  
 
repetitious 
Administrative Hearings Procedures for Medicaid Recipients and 
Providers S 9(1)(5), p. 17. 
By saying that evidence of Weber Memorial's costs is 
irrelevant, we are not implying that evidence respecting an 
individual faciity would be irrelevant in eyery Medicaid rate 
challenge. The federal statute and guidelines thereunder do 
provide grounds for challenging a state's rate structure - but 
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only when that challenge is based upon the needs of Medicaid 
recipients, B££ the needs of health care providers; and only when 
the statutory provision is not committed to the discretion of the 
agency to interpret and apply. 
For example, federal law requires the state to "take 
into account the situation of hospitals which serve a 
disproportionate number of low income patients with special 
needs." 42 U.S.C. S 1396A(a)(13)(A). This was precisely the 
issue in the case most heavily relied on by Weber Memorial, 
Thomas yff Johnston, supra. In yhomas, plaintiffs were mentally 
retarded and physically disabled children who were eligible for 
nursing care. When the State of Texas set its rate at the 
fortieth percentile of aggregate nursing industry costsr the 
court concluded that the State "did not adequately take into 
consideration certain highly relevant factors, most importantly, 
that some providers such as Ada Wilson Hospital, are responsible 
for the care of a greater proportion of persons whose needs are 
greater, and therefore whose care is more costly than other 
providers." id. The hospital prevailed in Thomson v.Johnson 
because it convinced the court that indigent, mentally retarded 
children would not be cared for properly under Texas1 rate. Id. 
at 893. 
If Weber Memorial had come to the hearing offering 
evidence that it cared for a patient group with specialized 
needs, such evidence would have been admissible. No such 
evidence was proffered by Weber Memorial. 
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ah's population 
Likewise, a provider or recipient of Medicaid is 
entitled to offer evidence that patients in one or more 
geographic areas are not being served as a result of the rate. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396A(a)(13(A) (states must "assure that 
individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable 
access, taking in account geographic location and reasonable 
travel time to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality.") 
If Weber Memorial were the only nursing facility located in its 
region of Utah, such an argument might be presented. However, 
Weber Memorial is located in the heart of U1 
center on the Wasatch Front, where nursing homes abound. 
Finally, Weber Memorial might have, buyt id not, argue 
that Utah's rate was inadeqwuate "to provid^ care and services in 
i 
conformity with . . . quality and safety standards." 42 U.S.C. S 
1396a(A)(13)(A) 
At the hearing, Weber Memorial proposed to introduce 
its costs into the record simplicitur, to shiow that the facility 
was being economically and efficiently operated. It would then, 
j 
in their eyes, be the state1s responsibility to show that their 
operation was uneconomical or inefficient. Counsel for Weber 
Memorial stated it as follows: 
The cornerstone of what we're trying to do in 
the context of this appeal is to literally 
make ourselves naked in front of phe State of 
Utah Iquite a thought] and to sayL "please 
examine us and please look at all of these 
costs and we'll prove it to you tpat we have 
done everything in our power to g£t those costs down to rock bottom . 
would like, ultimately, for a court to do, is 
to come to a finding or a hearing officer, 
saying that this facility is efficiently and 
economically operated by whatever standards 
What we 
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are used, it is, and if somehow we're wasting 
money and they can show that then that's fair 
game. I don't think they'll be able to. 
lQ_I£i Weber flemorjal gareg^ of 
Health, Civil No. C-85-4268, Reporter's Transcript of 
Proceedings, January 22, 1986, pp. 48, 49. Weber Memorial's 
proffer, if it had been accepted by the hearing officer, would 
have placed every facility cost on Utah in the examining table 
for a determination of its reasonableness and necessity. This is 
precisely the system of reasonable cost reimbursement which was 
rejected by Congress in 1980. In the pre-1980 period, the Health 
Department was frequently involved in haggling over costs and 
their "reasonableness and necessity." Bitter disputes were had 
between nursing homes and the department of health over whether 
snowmobiles could be considered a "reasonable expense" related to 
patient care. By authorizing the states to use rates Congress 
did away with this scrutiny of individual facility costs. 
Judge Fishier responded to counsel for Weber Memorial's 
argument with the following statement: 
What you're saying is you have a problem with 
the flat rates; because if you have such a 
hearing [to examine facility costs] what 
you're doing is you're eliminating the flat 
rate. That's basically what you're saying. 
Because once you make the inquiry into the 
cost of the quart of milk, the cost of hiring 
registered nurses — once you've done that 
you've eliminated the flat rate. 
1£. at page 58. Judge Fishier was absolutely correct. A 
detailed examination of individual facility costs for 
reasonableness for economy or efficiency would put us right back 
to the old system of reasonable cost reimbursement. 
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This identical issue was ruled upon by Judge Judith 
Billings in a similar District Court case. In flalg gare Center, 
loc^y.^Pepartment,fif„Bgaltfe, Third District Court, Utah, 
February, 1984, C-83-4654, Judge Billings h^ld that, "It is not 
required, nor is there a need, to examine the costs of a 
particular nursing home to determine whether that nursing home is 
economically and efficiently run." Id. "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law." Whereas costs relating to specialized care 
or geographical access to care are relevant in rate cases, such 
evidence was not proffered by Weber Memorial. The proffer in 
this case was a bald attempt to establish the administrative law 
judge as a super administrator to reformulate Utah's Medicaid 
rates so as to cure the business errors of the owners and 
managers of Weber Memorial. 
In essence, apart from a rate which is arbitrary and 
capricious, the requirement that states set payment rates at a 
level which reimburses the "economical" andi "efficient" provider 
is a matter left to agency discretion. Under the Boren 
Amendment, it is for states, subject to approval by the federal 
contracting agency, to supply meaning and Context to the words 
"economy" and "efficiency." 
THE UTAH MEDICAID AGENCY HAS CORRECTLY 
CLASSIFIED PATIENTS AT WEBER MEMORIAL. 
A. Weber Memorial has not made a prima facie case of 
incorrect patient classification. 
Weber Memorial's argument on patient classification is, 
if possible, even less substantial than the previous arguments. 
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During the hearing, one expert testified that approximately 
thirty-eight patients at the facility had been arbitrarily 
classified by the Department as intermediate rather than skilled 
patients. Skilled patients, by definition, require ©ore 
intensive care and receive a higher rate of reimbursement. The 
thirty-eight patients were neyer^named nor identified. The 
State, therefore, had no opportunity to rebut the testimony since 
only the conclusory allegation that "approximately thirty-eight 
patients" had been improperly classified was introduced. A 
general allegation that about thirty-eight unnamed patients have 
been incorrectly classified does not form a satisfactory basis 
for a ruling by the court. What could the court possibly have 
done on that information? It would have been absurd for the fair 
hearing officer to order the State to upgrade the classification 
on thirty-eight patients from intermediate to skilled care 
without even knowing which patients were involved. 
The State's definition of "skilled care" under Medicaid 
is essentially identical to the definition of skilled care used 
by the Medicare Program. See 42 C.F.R. S 409.30 to 409.35 and 
Tr. pp.362-64. The Medicare definition of skilled care adopted 
by the State on December 15, 1981 involves a four-pronged 
analysis. First, the severity of the patient1s illness and the 
degree of impairment is assessed. Second, the intensity of 
services ordered by the patient's attending physician is reviewed 
in light of the patient's severity of illness and degree of 
impairment, to insure that the patient is neither overserved nor 
underserved. Third, the patient's anticipated outcome is 
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Tr., Kurt Matthia, 
analyzed, i.e., the purpose of the services ordered for the 
patient is reviewed. (For example, is the patient in need of 
rehabilitation to regain lost functions? Or, is the patient*s 
condition stable, but chronic?) Fourth, the treatment setting is 
reviewed to insure that the facility in which the patient resides 
can provide all the services necessary for the patient and yet be 
the least restrictive setting possible, so as to minimize the 
deleterious effects of institutionalization, 
pp. 364-67. This four-pronged definition of skilled care is used 
nationwide and has gained wide acceptance in the medical 
community generally. Tr., Kurt Matthia pp. 367-8. 
Plaintiffs contend that the percentage of skilled 
patients in Utah's Medicaid Program is low compared to other 
states. This argument is extremely unpersu^sive. Since each 
state participating in Medicaid is entitled 
definition of skilled care, it is not clear 
between states is legitimate. This is especially true with 
comparison states such as California which choose not to provide 
intermediate care at all, so that their percentage of skilled 
patients would be artificially high — indeed 100%. Tr., Sharon 
Wasek, p. 305-07. Finally, and most important, even if such a 
comparison were possible, it is difficult to see how the practice 
of other states bears on the ultimate questi< 
adoption or application of the Medicare defii 
care is unreasonable. The evidence belies a radical decline 
following the December, 1981 adoption of the Medicare definition 
of skilled care. Beginning as early as 1976 and continuing to 
to establish its own 
that any comparison 
on of whether Utah's 
nition of skilled 
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the present, there has been a gradual sloping decline in the 
number of skilled care patients. This gradual and continual 
decline in the percentage of skilled patients did not result from 
any artificial manipulation of the definition, but from two 
independent factors. First, the increasing sophistication and 
medical expertise of the persons doing level of care 
determinations and utilization review. Tr., Kurt Matthia, p. 
356-61. Second, the increasing trend toward deinstitutionalizing 
patients in every setting, which for example, has resulted in the 
availability of hospice care for the terminally ill. Tr., Kurt 
Matthia, p. 442, 443. 
In addition, there was no physicain testimony to 
indicate that these patients were in fact skilled care level 
patients. Ruth Croft, an R.N. at Weber Memorial testified that 
the thirty-eight odd patients had been identified in a review of 
intermediate care patients (apparently it was assumed no skilled 
patients in the facility were wrongfully classified) performed by 
herself (an R.N.), one additional registered nurse, the 
administrator of the facility (who is neither a registered nurse 
nor a physician) and the facility1 s "business manager11. The 
review did not involve any physicians at all. The attending 
physicians of the approximate thirty-eight patients were not 
consulted, although they are legally responsible for prescribing 
the appropriate medical services and making the initial 
determination of the level of care. Tr.f Ruth Croft, pp. 765-69. 
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B. Weber Memorial has not utilized the available 
•ethod of challenging patient classification. 
I 
Most importantly, the formal hearing and trial process 
is not the proper forum in which to resolve issues involving the 
proper assignment of level of care for these and other individual patients. The patients themselves or their 
appeal the determination of level of care. 
representatives can 
The record indicates 
that none of the patients at Weber Memorial Care Center has ever 
done so. Tr., Kurt Matthia, p. 368-69. The facility itself can 
request a reconsideration of a patient1s leyel of care at any 
time. Tr., Kurt Matthia, p. 351. The record further indicates 
that in the three years prior to the hearing in which Weber 
Memorial Care Center operated, no requests tor reconsideration 
were ever made. Ruth Croft testified that she had never notified 
the State that she felt any of the "about" thirty-eight patients 
had been improperly classified. Neither had any of the 
approximate thirty-eight patients or their families ever 
contacted the State concerning an allegedly improper 
classification of level of care. Weber Memorial has simply 
failed to use the avenues which are open to it for getting a 
reconsideration of individual persons1 level of care. 
TBE DISTRICT COURT USED THE CORRECT STANDARD 
OP REVIEW. 
Weber Memorial argues for the first time that the 
District Court incorrectly employed the "capricious, or not 
supported by the evidence" standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. S 
26-23-2(3) • 
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A* Weber Memorial cannot raise this issue for the 
first tine in the Intermediate Court of Appeals. 
Weber Memorial knew, before Judge Fishier ever made a 
finding of fact or conclusion of law, that Judge Fishier would 
employ the standard of review set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
S 26-23-2(3) which provides as follows: 
If the final determination of the Executive 
Director is consistent with the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law recommended by 
the hearing officer, the Court shall review 
the record and may alter the final 
determination only upon a finding that the 
final determination is capricious, or not 
supported by the evidence. 
The State Department of Health filed a reply brief in Judge 
Fishier1s Court on January 16, 1986. The first page of that 
brief states as follows: 
I. Standard of Review. 
It is worthwhile to recall standard for 
the District Court1s review of the agency's 
hearing decision. Sections 26-23-2(3) of the 
Utah Code directs that: "The Court shall 
review the record and may alter the final 
determination only upon a finding that the 
final determination is capricious, or not 
supported by the evidence." . . . With this 
standard in mind we turn now to plaintiff's 
arguments. 
Id. pp. 1-3. After the quoted pleading was filed by the State 
Weber Memorial filed several other documents with the District 
Court, argued before the Court twice, and met with Judge Fishier 
in chambers on at least one occasion-and at no time did counsel 
for Weber Memorial challenge the aforesaid standard of review. 
It is fundamental in Utah, that issues not raised to a lower 
Court are not reviewable for the first time on appeal. fiundy_yx 
Century Equipment Co., Inc.. 692 P.2d 754 Utah 1984; Travner v. 
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Cashing, 688 P.2d 856 Utah 1984; Combe_yf }id\rtens family prive 
Inns. Inc.. 680 P.2d 733 Utah 1984. Weber Memorial should not be 
allowed to challenge Judge Fishier1s ruling on grounds that he 
employed an inappropriate standard, when that issue was never 
presented to Judge Fishier for consideratioij. 
B. The District Court employed the correct standard. 
The cases cited by Weber Memorial are simply not on 
the case of State of 
1983 involving 
point. To begin with, Weber Memorial cites 
Minnesota y. fleckler, 78 F.2d 854 (8th Cir.) 
review of agency decisions under the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Actf.:i U.S.C. Section 5551 et. sea. In the case of 
Mary Washington Hospital, Inc. vf fisher, 6^ 5 F.Supp. 891 (E.D. 
Va. 1985) the Court considered whether the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act applied to decisions by State agencies operating 
Medicaid programs. The Court concluded that "the [A.P.A.] is 
clear on its face that it applies only to federal agencies" id. 
at 897. The only federal guidelines for State agency review of 
Medicaid rates is set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations: 
The Medicaid agency must provide an appeals or 
exception procedure that allows individual 
providers an opportunity to submit additional 
evidence and receive administrative review, 
with respect to such issues as the agency 
determines appropriate, of payment rates. 
42 C.F.R. section 447.253 1983. Thus, the federal statute merely 
of "appeals or 
must give review to 
provides that States must provide some kind 
exception procedure" and that the procedure 
'such issues as the [state] agency determines appropriate". This 
does not provide any formulaic standard of review for states to 
use, and allows maximum state discretion in establishing such 
appeals or exceptions procedures. 
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The only Utah case with i s provided by Weber Memorial 
to support i t s argument i s £a l t_ take_Ci^^oip x _y x _pepartment_of 
Employment , 657 P.2d 1312, 1316, Utah 1982 in which the Court 
s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 
On most quest ions of s tatutory construct ion , 
Sith_spme_exception, our review i s plenary 
with no deference accorded the adminis trat ive 
determination, (emphasis added). 
The Sa l t Lake City Corp. case does not deal with the j u d i c i a l 
review of an adminis trat ive ac t ion of the Health Department under 
Sect ion 2 6 - 2 3 - 2 , and even the general language quoted from Salt 
Lake City Corp. a l ludes to except ions t o the general r u l e . Weber 
Memorial i s simply asking the Court to overturn Judge Fishier 
because he employed the standard of review which i s mandated 
e x p l i c i t l y by U.C.A. S 2 6 - 2 3 - 2 ( 3 ) . 
CfiNCLOSION 
In summary, Utah's modified f l a t rate i s not 
unreasonable nor arbi trary . The hearing o f f i c e r and d i s t r i c t 
court judge correc t ly ruled on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y quest ion and 
p l a i n t i f f s have not even made a prima f a c i e case for incorrect 
pat ient c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court1s rul ing was based on 
the appropriate standard of review, was correct as a matter of 
law, and should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s /j?ff^day of May, 1987. 
CLARK C. GRAVES J/ 
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Attorney for Defendants 
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Tab A 
42 USCS § 1396a 
TITLE XIX. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 
§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance 
(a) Contents. A State plan for medical assistance mu t^— 
(13) provide— 
(A)(i) for the inclusion of some institutional an 
tional care and services, and some non-institu-
health services 
entitled to skil 
for any individual 
ed nursing facility 
(ii) for the inclusion of home 
who, under the State plan, is 
services, and 
(B) in the case of individuals receiving aid or aisistance under the 
State^Jan approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title 
IV [42 USCS §§301-304, 306, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1206, 1351-
1355, 1381-1383c, or 601-610], for the inclusion bf at least the care 
and services listed in clauses (1) through (5) of Section 1905(a) [42 
USCS§ 1396d(a)], and | 
(C) in the case of individuals not included under subparagraph (B) for 
the inclusion of at least— 
(i) the care and services listed in clauses (1) thiough (5) of section 
1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(lM5)] or ( 
(h)(1) the care and services listed in any 7 of the clauses nuirbered 
(I) through (14) of such section [42 USCS § 1396d(a)OM14)] and 
(II) in the event the care and services provided under the State 
plan include hospital or skilled nursing facility services, physicians' 
services to an individual in a hospital or ski led nursing facility 
during any period he is receiving hospital services from such 
hospital or skilled nursing facility services from such home [facil-
ity], and 
(D) for payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services 
provided under the plan, as determined in accordance with methods 
and standards, consistent with section 1122 [42 USCS § 1320a-1], 
which shall be developed by the State and reviewed and approved by 
the Secretary and (after notice of approval by thej Secretary) included 
in the plan, except that the reasonable cost of any such services as 
determined under such methods and standards shall not exceed the 
amount which would be determined under sectiok 1861(v) [42 USCS 
§ 1395x(v)] as the reasonable cost of such services! for purposes of title 
XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395-1395b, 1395c-1395i. 1395i-2, 1395j-1395w, 
1395x-!395dd, 1395FF-1395pp], and 
(E) effective July 1, 1976, for payment of the skjilled nursing facility 
and intermediate care facility services provided tinder the plan on a 
reasonable cost related basis, as determined in accordance with 
methods and standards which shall be developed by the Slate on the 
basis of cost-finding methods approved and verified by the Secretary; 
TabB 
TITLE 42-THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
SUBCHAPTER XIX-GRANTS TO STATES 
FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
§ 1396a. State plans for medical aaiintance 
(a) Contents 
A State plan for medical assistance must— 
(13) provide— 
(A) for payment (except where [the State 
agency is subject to an order under section 
1396m of this title) of the hospital, skilled 
nursing facility, and intermediate care fa-
cility services provided under the plan 
through the use of rates (determined in ac-
cordance with methods and standards devel-
oped by the State and which, in the case of 
hospitals, take into account the situation of 
hospitals which serve a disproportionate 
number of low income patients wjith special 
needs and provide, in the case of hospital 
patients receiving services at an inappropri-
ate level of care (under conditions similar to 
those described in section 1395x(iO(l)(G) of 
this title), for lower reimbursement rates re-
flecting the level of care actually received 
(in a manner consistent with section 
1395x(v)(l)(G) of this title)) Which the 
State finds, and makes assurances satisfac-
tory to the Secretary, are reasonable and 
adequate to meet the costs which must be 
incurred by efficiently and economically op-
erated facilities in order to provide care and 
services in conformity with applicable State 
and Federal laws, regulations, and quality 
and safety standards and to assure that in-
dividuals eligible for medical assistance 
have reasonable access (taking into account 
geographic location and reasonable travel 
time) to inpatient hospital services of ade-
quate quality; and such State makes further 
assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, 
for the filing of uniform cost] reports by 
each hospital, skilled nursing facility, and 
intermediate care facility and periodic 
audits by the State of such reports; and 
(B) for payment for services described in 
section 1396d(a)(2)(B) of this title provided 
by a rural health clinic under the plan of 
100 percent of costs which a « reasonable 
and related to the cost of furhishing such 
services or based on such otheri tests of rea-
sonableness, as the Secretary may prescribe 
in regulations under section 1395/(a)(3) of 
this title, or. in the case of services to which 
those regulations do not apply, on such 
tests of reasonableness as the Secretary 
may prescribe in regulations urider this sub-
paragraph; 
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SECTION 227—ITEIMBUKSEMKNT KATKS UNDER M1JMCAI1) FOR SKILLED 
NUKSINO AND 1NTEKMLDIATK CAKK FACILITIES 
Present law requires States participating in medicaid to pay skilled 
nursing facilities (SXFs) and inteimediate care facilities (ICFs) 
on a reasonable cost-related ba-is. This requirement, added by Section 
249(a) of the Social Security Amendment** of 1!)72. was designed to 
assure that payment rates would moie elo-rlv lelled the reasonable 
costs necessary to provide nursing home service.- of adequate quality. 
Section 249(a) gives States the option of u-ing medicaiic^ reasonable 
cost reimbui-ement formula for purpo-e- of leimbui-ing SXFs and 
ICFs or developing other rea-onable cost-related methods of reini-
buisement acceptable to the Secretary. 
States have argued that the complex and iong-dcla\ed Federal regu-
lations implementing the statutory requirement of-ertion 21!)(a) have 
unduly restrained their administrative and ii-eal di-eietion and that 
the Federal approval process lias forced States to ivl\ hea\ ily on medi-
care principles of icimbur-ement. Neither of thc-e consequences was 
intended when section 249(a) \va.<> enacted 
Tho committee continues to believe that States should have flexi-
bility in developing methods of payment for theii medicaid program*-
and that application of the reasonable eo-l icimbui.-ement principle* 
of the medicare piogram for long-term rare facility sei vices is not 
enliiely satisfactory. These prim iple^ aie inheiently inflationary and 
contain no incenti cs foi ellicient peifoimance. 
The committee bill deletes tin* present language of section 1902 
( ; i l ( | : i ) < K ) n f the a.-l C w In* 11 \ \ a - a h l»d l . \ MM I mn -Jl ' .Ua) o f the 1072 
. • hit i« », i . in I • ••!• • •! nl ••- I iMj .Mi i" ! »\ | », |. o | \ | . . 11 ir S la t« - flexibility 
a ih l < I M h i i n n . * h b j e e | l o t h e • l ; i l u l u i \ l • i|h*i • I. » I. • •!' ' .hi* - i t i u ' 
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and the existing requirements of section 1902 (d) (30) and section 1121 
of the Act, to formulate their own methods and standards of payment. 
Under the bill, States would lie free to establish rates on a statewide 
or other geographic basis, a class basis, or an institution-by-institution 
basis, without reference to medicare principles of reimbursement. The 
flexibility ^iven the States is not intended to encourage arbitrary 
reductions in payment that would adversely aflcct the quality of care. 
Under the bill, the State would be required to find, and make as-
surances .satisfactory to the Secretary that the payment rate*, taking 
into account projected economic conditions luring the period for 
which the rates are set are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs 
which must bo incurred by efliciently and economically operated facil-
ities in order to provide care and services in conformity with ap-
plicable State and Federal laws, regulations and standards. The State 
would al>o be require*.I to assure the Secretary that it has provided for 
the tiling by the facilities of uniform cost reports and for their periodic 
audit by thu^tate. 
The Congress expects that the Secretary will keep regulatory and 
other requirements to that minimum necessary to assure proper ac-
countability, and not to overburden the States and facilities with mar-
ginal but massive paperwork requirements. It is expected that the 
assurances made by the States will be considered satisfactory in the 
absence of a formal finding to the contrary by the Secretary. 
In establishing rates, a State, at its option, could include incentive 
allowances designed to encourage cost containment through efiicient 
peiformanee. as well as incentives to attract investment where such 
investments would serve to alleviate demonstrated shortages of long-
term care services. In addition. States woidd continue to have the option 
provided in current Federal lobulations to adjust rates dov\nward for 
facilities with service deficiencies where facilities are classed by quality 
of service1 or level of care. 
The Secretary would be expected to continue to apply current reg-
ulations which require that payments made under State plans do not 
exceed amounts which would be determined under the medicare, prin-
ciples of reimbursement. Since States would ije free under the bill to 
establish payment rates without reference to (medicare principles of 
reimbursement, the Secretary would only be ck'peetcd to compare the 
average rates paid to SXFs participating in medicare with the average 
rates paid to SXFs participating in medicaid |n applying this limita-
tion. 
